Honours Dissertation

‘Looted art as an international issue’: From Nazi plunder to restitution, 1939-1951

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of BA (Hons) History.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DBFU</td>
<td>Führer’s Deputy for Supervising the Entire Spiritual and Ideological Training of the NSDAP</td>
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<td>ERR</td>
<td>Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (Reichsleiter Rosenberg Taskforce)</td>
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<td>MFA&amp;A</td>
<td>Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives branch</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>Smithsonian – AAA</td>
<td>Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
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Introduction

On 22 August 1945, at 3:30am, the Ghent Altarpiece, “the most important piece of artwork stolen by the Germans” was returned to Brussels’ Royal Palace.¹ This restitution represented the culmination of years of Allied efforts to protect European treasures looted by the Nazi party throughout the Second World War. Owing to the enormity of Nazi plunder, this was only the first of millions of cultural artefacts to be returned in the next half decade. As Jonathan Petropolous articulated, the Third Reich’s system of spoliation was, “a repressive rapacious aesthetic program”.² Thus, for the Allies to save Europe’s cultural artefacts from wartime destruction or acquisition, it was imperative to establish an efficient programme of restitution. In this instance, restitution shall be defined as it was by Thomas Carr Howe Jr. at the time: the settlement of “the claims of the occupied countries for everything the Germans had taken”.³

Typically associated with victorious armies claiming their rewards of war, the seizure of European artwork was “justified” by the argument of safekeeping. An ongoing process from Hitler’s appointment in 1933, the scale of Nazi plunder escalated in the Second World War. Despite being in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention, looting was made official policy.⁴ With that, the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) was created in 1940. Although a great number of agencies and personnel contributed to this breach of the Convention, the ERR was arguably the most efficacious.

Throughout its lifetime, millions of items were stolen, including: “gold, silver, currency, paintings and other works of art, coins, religious artifacts, and millions of books”.5

This dissertation shall assess how exactly such vast quantities of European art (and other cultural treasures) were appropriated in such a short space of time, as well as the Allied response to said appropriation. The first chapter shall examine the staff and methods of the ERR, specifically, its namesake Alfred Rosenberg and Hermann Goering. Due to the absence of translated Einsatzstab documents – despite their abundance – primary material used includes interrogation reports of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) Art Looting Investigation Unit.6 Created to “write an official history” of how Adolf Hitler and Hermann Goering’s art collections were accumulated, these documents provide a chronological narrative of Nazi policies of spoliation.7

Despite the magnitude of Nazi plunder, it receives minimal acknowledgement in many summative histories of the Second World War.8 Although Jonathan Petropolous has written a number of books dedicated to the topic of Nazi confiscations, the lack of secondary material on the plunder itself means that there is only limited historiographical debate on the issue.9 There is, however, disagreement regarding the organisation of the ERR. Petropolous first declared, “One should not get the impression that plundering was orderly or systematic”.10 Meanwhile, Avi Beker argued, the organisation of the ERR allowed for cooperation with individuals capable of providing

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the necessary intelligence to achieve “impressive results”.\footnote{Avi Beker, The Plunder of Jewish Property during the Holocaust: Confronting European History (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), p.167.} This dissertation shall advance the latter argument, proposing that the schemes of the ERR were well orchestrated, despite rivalry between the aforementioned Rosenberg and Goering.

Not only was the Nazi policy in breach of the articles of the Hague Convention, but it endangered European works of art, particularly contemporary artwork considered “degenerate” by Hitler and his ideological followers. For that reason, the US established the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, also known as the Roberts Commission, in 1943. Subsequently, the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives branch (MFA&A) – also recognised as the “Monuments Men” – was created. Each was intended to protect Europe’s monuments and save her artwork. In examining these structures, the second chapter shall disclose how the US responded to the discovery of Nazi plundering as they transcended European borders. The subsequent examination of post-war collecting points – formed to return these safeguarded objects – shall explain how American restitution functioned with the termination of war until 1951. Not only will the chapter demonstrate how the “USA led the art recovery and restitution effort”, but how there were instances where she actually hindered the restitution process.\footnote{Petropoulos, Art as Politics in the Third Reich, p.14.} In particular, the “Westward Ho” incident shall be examined.\footnote{Thomas Carr Howe Jr., Salt Mines and Castles, p.275.} To do this, interviews from the Smithsonian American Archives of Art shall be used. Collectively these form the “Monuments Men Series”.\footnote{“Monuments Men Series”, Smithsonian – AAA, http://www.aaa.si.edu/podcasts (last accessed 10 April 2016).} Additionally, reports produced by the first, fourth, ninth and twelfth US armies shall be used to illustrate how restitutational activities were recorded in the Second World War to then be used in its aftermath.\footnote{First, Third, Ninth and Twelfth US Army, MFA&A: Monthly Reports, September 1944 – February 1945, Reference: WO219/3914, War Office, Looted Art Collection, TNA, Kew; First, Third, Ninth and Twelfth US Army, MFA&A: Monthly Reports November 1944 – February 1945, Reference: WO219/3915, War Office, Looted Art Collection, TNA, Kew.}
Like the US, Britain was concerned with the protection and restitution of European culture; despite receiving greater physical damage as a result of the ongoing conflict. The final chapter therefore seeks to determine the extent of British contribution. Firstly, it shall observe the "Inter Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation and Control" of 1943. Subsequently, the chapter shall expand on the ventures of the MFA&A by considering the role of British officers in the unit. Finally, it shall consider the British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives and Other Material in Enemy Hands. This was the British equivalent to the Roberts Commission, also known as the Macmillan Committee, created in 1943. Through these observations, this dissertation shall highlight how British perceptions of Nazi plunder grew in a similar manner to those of the US. It shall be argued that British efforts provided much needed publicity for Western restitution. It shall also be argued that disregarding the British role within the MFA&A, provides an inaccurate history of the branch.

Primary material that shall be used to come to this conclusion includes documents from The National Archives (TNA) to show how the British element of the MFA&A functioned. Newspaper articles shall be used to demonstrate the favourable response the Inter Allied Declaration received. Meanwhile, MFA&A policy manuals and records (similar to the US reports) shall be used to show how the British element of the MFA&A functioned. In addition to this, the minutes of the Macmillan Committee and correspondence between associated officials shall then be used to study its coordination and activities. In doing this, a more extensive narrative of British restitution efforts shall be created than has previously existed.

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16 Copy of "Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation of Control" (with covering Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Explanatory Memorandum issued by the Parties to the Declaration), Reference: FO371/36363/1, Looted Art Collection, TNA, Kew.
18 Minutes of Meetings Book signed by the Chairman, including terms of reference and names of members of committee (British Committee on the Preservation of Works of Art, Archives and other Materials in Enemy Hands), 1944-1946, Reference: T209/2, Looted Art Collection, TNA, Kew.
Whilst there is limited literature specifically concerning Nazi plunder, there is even less written on its restitution. One especially important book for the topic of restitution is Michael J. Kurtz’s *America and the Return of Nazi Contraband*. Not only does it acknowledge key participants in the looting process but the American response to such looting during and after the war. Laurie Rush has also contributed to the topic but includes little discussion on British restitution. The second and third chapter of this dissertation shall contrastingly consider American and British restitution efforts. This comparison is particularly rewarding because so far, little has been written about the British contribution. In this context it shall be argued that Britain was vital to the process. Whilst it was not possible for Britain to make as great a contribution as America – owing to the greater economic impact of the Second World War – it provided “crucial intelligence and personnel” (in addition to publicity).\(^\text{21}\)

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\(^{19}\) Kurtz, *America and the Return of Nazi Contraband*.


Chapter 1: Nazi Plunder – how it happened

The objective of this chapter is to determine how the scale of cultural plunder by the Nazi state was so great through the years 1939 to 1945, thus covering the entirety of the Second World War. Arguably, the most notable reason for the phenomenal extent of Nazi theft was Adolf Hitler’s ambition to create the world’s largest art collection: the Führermuseum.\(^\text{22}\) Hitler himself wrote the paintings he had gathered “had never been collected for private purposes, but only for the extension of a gallery” in his home town of Linz.\(^\text{23}\) However, little is known about how this ambition was supposed to become a reality.

This chapter shall therefore explore the exact methods of the aforementioned official Nazi confiscation service of occupied territory during World War Two: the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR). Also known as the Reichsleiter Rosenberg Taskforce, the ERR was created by its eponym Alfred Rosenberg. For this reason, how the agency was impacted by his behaviour and reputation shall be examined. Similarly, Hitler’s designated successor at the time, Hermann Goering, is to be studied. Specifically, his involvement with the ERR and the significance of his motivations and corresponding actions shall be studied to determine how Goering fundamentally commandeered the ordinance of the ERR. Here the interrogation reports of the Art Looting Investigation Unit of the OSS shall be used to compare the influence of these two figures in the “greatest displacement of works of art in history”.\(^\text{24}\) These provide evidence of Nazi art thievery whilst overcoming the language barrier originally faced.

\(^{22}\) Petropoulos, *Art as Politics in the Third Reich*, P.90.
Alfred Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg

Alfred Rosenberg was appointed the “Führer’s Deputy for Supervising the Entire Spiritual and Ideological Training of the NSDAP” (DBFU) in 1934 and given “full authority to bring the art world of Germany into line” in 1937. Due to his virulent anti-Semitism he was then made the Minister of Eastern Occupied (Soviet) Territories in 1941. Thus, it is not surprising that he was one of Hitler’s leading spokesmen on art and culture. Like Hitler, Rosenberg believed modern art to be the “product of a Communist-Jewish conspiracy to undermine the ‘beauty-ideal’ of the Aryan Race”. The “degeneracy” of modern art was not in its substance but embodied in the person who created it. Consequently, whilst the ERR’s “primary and theoretical function” had initially been to collect political material “for exploitation in the struggle against Jewry and Freemasonry” only, its activities eventually encompassed the Poles and Bolsheviks too.

Although Rosenberg’s anti-Semitic (and anti-Bolshevik) agenda may have determined the agency’s priorities, in reality it is more likely that the ERR’s proficiency was due to the sheer scale and efforts of its large bureaucracy. As DBFU in the years preceding the formation of the agency, Rosenberg’s office already had specialised divisions in most art and cultural fields; from these units came most of the staff for the ERR. Similarly, as of September 1940 – on Hitler’s authority – the ERR was to be considered part of the Wehrmacht (the collective German Armed Forces) and so given all support possible. Despite his posts in the “Nazi party apparatus”, Rosenberg was widely

29 Plaut, “Consolidated Interrogation Report No.1”, p.3.
considered subsidiary in the cultural domain and so had limited power himself even before the war had begun.\[^{32}\] For example, the personal Chancellery to Rosenberg co-ordinated many of his functions: Gerhard Utikal was the operational director of the DBFU whilst also the ERR’s chief of operations (in all countries).\[^{33}\] Moreover, it is unlikely the ERR was run according to Rosenberg’s ideologies because he allegedly “deplored” the need to undertake the mission of the ERR.\[^{34}\] Arguably, he only continued with the task because the work carried out could be “made felt in the dissemination of National Socialist cultural propaganda” and so was considered important “for history”.\[^{35}\]

The ERR-orchestrated looting was not simply an anticipated by-product of war. With headquarters based in Berlin and further offices distributed across Germany, thousands actively contributed. The agency also operated in the occupied Soviet lands through three main task forces along geographical lines: HAG-Ostland, HAG-Mitte and HAG-Ukraine in the Baltic; Belorussia and western Russia, and Ukraine respectively.\[^{36}\] Cultural plunder occurred in nearly every country in Europe but the scale of plunder in France, Belgium, Italy and Holland was the greatest. It was a methodical and systematic process that consistently targeted specific groups – especially Jewish art collectors – from the time of the organisation’s formation until the war’s close. Its exceptional nature carried into Germany 21,903 artefacts: including 10,890 paintings and pictures.\[^{37}\] Even when “the reversal of German military fortunes” was increasingly imminent in the summer of 1944, the ERR still remained active.\[^{38}\]

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\[^{34}\] Plaut, “Consolidated Interrogation Report No.1”, p.46.


\[^{36}\] Grimsted, “Roads to Ratibor”, p.396.


\[^{38}\] Collins and Rothfeder, “The Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg”, p.31.
The most plundered country was France. This was most likely due to Paris being one of the richest cities in art in this period. Mark Mazower argued France became such a prime target because the Nazis “both admired and despised” the nation for its association with the arts. As a result of Nazi looting, the market had flourished as curators were not especially concerned with the provenance of art work. It was inundated with the stolen artwork people hoped to sell, including French citizens themselves. Hector Feliciano went so far as to declare the war a “godsend” for the Parisian art market. The French Jewish were targeted after Hitler authorised the confiscation of their art collections. Once they had fled, their possessions were to be considered “ownerless”. Even those who had succeeded in taking their artwork with them were liable to have their property confiscated as they were accused of avoiding a “Refugee Tax”. The most prominent example of targeted confiscations was the seizure of the private collections of the renowned Rothschild family.

Also directly involved in the appropriation of art through the ERR were the German secret police (the Gestapo), the SS, Nazi art historians and French informers, art dealers and collaborationist historians. All of these agents were tasked with – or somehow involved with – locating artwork for which Germany staked a “historical claim”. Once encountered, these agents were to confiscate and catalogue all such items, cataloguing their actions as they did so. As a result, massive albums containing the meticulous detail of confiscated art and its location were created, accompanied by photographs of the items in question. Similarly, registration cards were created that included: names and addresses, the number of crates that were confiscated (and when) as well as characterisations of the pieces taken by which agent. Although it was expected that most professional art historians and dealers outside of Germany would be committed to the anti-Nazi resistance – like Rose Valland, who shall be discussed in the following chapter – many were not.

40 Petropolous, The Faustian Bargain, p.70.
41 Plaut, “Consolidated Interrogation Report No.1”, p.3.
instead having played a vital role in the undertakings of the ERR. Such people made up the unit “Arbeitsgruppe Louvre.” A part of this group, including the likes of Kajetan Muhlmann and Ernst Buchner, rationalised their behaviour on the grounds that they were “safeguarding cultural property; following orders and taking what was rightfully Germany’s”. As Jonathan Petropoulos stated, a number of individuals collaborated because they too believed that by “discovering” the roots of a “great culture” and advancing it, they could enrich the German national consciousness.

Understandably, there were still those with conflicting thoughts when it came to assisting the German Nazi state. However, those who opposed the programme of cultural theft were usually forced out by Nazi leadership. This represented part of the process of “purging or cleansing” the nation of possible threats. However, it was not always that straightforward. For example, there were a number of German officials who criticised the “felonious activity of the Einsatzstab”, including Count Wolff Metternich, the leader of the German military organisation – Kuntschutz – intended to protect artwork. Despite his frequently open condemnations of ERR staff, Rosenberg still made active attempts to entertain him and change his opinion. Eventually he was relieved of his position but he was not victimised; in employment or privately, likely because he had “considerable inside knowledge”.

The role of Hermann Goering

Although the ERR was formed by Alfred Rosenberg – and headed by Utikal – Goering had significant influence within the agency. Confiscations of the ERR in France may have been under the authority

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44 Plaut, “Consolidated Interrogation Report, No.1”, p.4.
45 Petropoulos, “Art Historians and Nazi plunder”, p.6.
46 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
of the Reichschancellery, but all of “the important operations were dominated by Goering.”

Originally, the ERR was to claim books and documents to create an alternative university for the Nazi elite, the *Hohe Schule*. It was thought with a better knowledge of their enemies, the latter could be more easily defeated. Thus, plunder would comprise of informative library and archival documents only. However, in late 1940, Goering – with his apparent “collector’s passion” – issued an order that fundamentally altered the overall remit of the ERR. Within said order was a six point list that informed the Chief of the Military Administration in Paris of how the ERR was to prioritise moving “categories of art objects” of Jewish provenance to the Louvre, despite the ERR not previously acquiring or moving art. The instruction specified the following would be moved: art for Hitler to personally inspect; that which Goering had claimed for his personal possession; anything suitable for the *Hohe Schule* and anything appropriate for higher education, German museums or for sale at auction. Thus, if it were not for Goering, it is likely such vast confiscations of art would not have occurred at the hands of the ERR.

Heinrick Fraenkel and Roger Manvell argued it was possible for this order to be initiated because of a “psychological need in most dictators”. Hitler and Goering had agreed the latter was to build “The Hermann Goering Collection” to eventually be gifted to the nation. Accordingly, the order was given because Goering was expected to “emulate” Hitler’s desire to acquire and build an invaluable art collection. Contrastingly, Michael J. Kurtz implied the order was likely instigated simply because Goering was a man who “had a tremendous lust for art, both as a collector and a seller, to feather his own nest”. Here the latter argument shall be enforced. Although Goering was

51 Plaut, “Consolidated Interrogation Report, No.1”, p.5.
53 Hermann Goering, “Göring-order of November 5th, 1940” 5 November 1940, Reference: T209/29/10, Looted Art Collection, TNA, Kew.
54 Goering, “Göring-order of November 5th, 1940”.
relied upon by Hitler to inform him of “any interesting confiscations for the Linz project”, it seems
Goering took advantage of his position to appropriate the ERR for his own determination.\(^{59}\) In
reality, Goering was “Hitler’s chief rival in the looting of Europe”\(^ {60}\). He was at liberty to pick and
choose whatever artwork suited his inclination. As long as the Führer was informed of his purchases,
Goering essentially had a blank cheque to attain whatever he pleased.

Evidence of Goering’s personal interest is provided by the “Consolidated Interrogation
Report of the Activity of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France” of the OSS which lists the dates of
Goering’s numerous visits to the Museum Jeu de Paume in Paris.\(^ {61}\) During these frequent visits, he
would select the most desirable items of French Jewish collections confiscated by the ERR. Here he
would then have the artwork appraised by Parisian artists who held him in good favour and so
would value the artwork at unrealistically low prices. Consequently, he was able to make “an
apparently “legal” purchase almost as attractive as a bare-faced theft”.\(^ {62}\) The sale would be
legitimate and inexpensive whilst allowing him to expand his collection. Hitler famously declared
modern artwork to be “synonymous with all manifestations of social degeneracy” and yet Goering
would pilfer such work for himself.\(^ {63}\) Tasked with building a collection on Hitler’s behalf, he would
sell degenerate artwork on the international market or have his adviser – Walter Andreas Hofer –
use such items for bartering in negotiations with art dealers. Although he did pass on many of his
confiscations to Hitler, with the conclusion of the war, the extent of his personal plundering was
made apparent. 8 residences were found to be filled with modern art, including his home; Karinhall.
It is nearly impossible to know what motivates a person; however in this instance it is apparent
Goering was more likely motivated by personal ambition than by Hitler’s command.

It has already been noted that if it were not for Goering’s extensive involvement, the
function of the ERR would have followed a completely different direction. However, this was neither

\(^{61}\) Plaut, “Consolidated Interrogation Report, No.1”, p.6.
\(^{62}\) SHAEF, “Appreciation of Enemy Methods”, p.22.
a positive or negative transformation; it was simply a change that happened. Consequently, one question that remains to be answered – one that seems to only be hinted at in primary documentation (and some secondary literature) and never explicitly addressed – is whether or not Hermann Goering benefitted or endangered the job of the ERR. Despite an absence of official association between the ERR and any of his agents, it was evident from the outset Goering was to use the confiscation of artwork by the ERR as a source for his own collection. This was possible because Goering had a higher political ranking than Rosenberg. He was needed to bring a greater legitimacy to the organisation. His egocentric behaviour was likely permitted because he brought the promise of influence, deemed necessary by Rosenberg, in what was a “highly competitive environment”.

The aforementioned “Report of the Activity of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France”, evaluated the impact of Goering’s affiliation with the ERR, as follows:

The efficiency of the Einsatzstab undertaking was jeopardized consistently through lack of authoritative direction and by internal friction…the GOERING monopoly undermined morale, in that the staff was precluded from carrying out its basic (HITLER) directive. Rosenberg’s political weakness in the Party hierarchy [sic], moreover, made itself felt even in the lower echelons of his organization.

Unmistakeably, the report argues with negative connotations the severity of Goering’s impact upon the ERR. The accuracy of this complaint is debatable. Although it implies that Goering’s interference inhibited workers’ abilities to gather research for the Hohe Schule, Kurtz argued – “everything was directed towards the building up of the ‘Führermuseum’”. The organisation may not have been collecting as much research material as was originally intended but that did not mean they were following the Führer’s orders any less. Just because it appeared Goering had drastically changed the direction of the ERR’s focus does not mean that its efficiency had been jeopardised. It was working

64 Petropolous, The Faustian Bargain, p.131.
66 De Jaeger, The Linz File, p.54.
towards the same ultimate goal but simply had a different means of doing so. As Patricia Kennedy Grimsted argued, “Neither the Red Army library brigades nor the Western MFA&A could match the ERR for organisation and record-keeping”. Subsequently, Goering’s direct involvement or even just his presence, may have weakened the stability within the rank of the organisation but it does not mean that the ERR was in danger of inefficiency.

**Conclusion**

Confusion was undoubtedly caused amongst workers as they did not always know who they represented or whose directives to follow. Nonetheless, this did not stop the ERR from being one of the greatest looting agencies. Nor had it limited its ambitions. Shipments of its confiscations could only continue until the summer of 1944 because of the agency’s organisation. With its participation – by the end of the war – the ERR had collectively gathered millions of works of art, manuscripts and books. In today’s value, the Nazi plunder of European cultural artefacts staggeringly amounted to more than $20 billion. Though Goering's presence created uncertainty, as Hitler’s second-in-command, he enabled the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s contribution to the Nazi state’s “planned complete rearrangement of Europe’s entire patrimony in accordance with Nazi ideology”. All of this simply occurred alongside Goering’s attempts to “get ahead of Hitler”. Although Alfred Rosenberg was the eponym for the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, his role did not stretch much further than that. Rosenberg was fundamentally a “titular head”. Nonetheless, his significance at the time of the ERR’s creation cannot be ignored. If it were not for his position, the agency would not have had the staff it did and so could not have developed as it had.

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68 Marrus, *Some Measure of Justice*, p.36.
Chapter 2: The American saviour? The US protection and restitution of Europe’s art

Having discussed the practice of Nazi plunder during the Second World War, this chapter seeks to explore the American reaction to this spoliation. In what limited literature there is available on American restitution, there is little variation.\textsuperscript{72} The US is portrayed as the hero, capable because her territory had not been directly affected by war. In recent years, films like \textit{The Monuments Men} and \textit{Woman in Gold} publicise a similar perception, embellishing the heroic nature of US actions.\textsuperscript{73} In reality, instances of US military looting and the Wiesbaden incident – to be discussed subsequently – show there was duplicity within the restitution process.\textsuperscript{74} For that reason, these arguments shall be re-evaluated in order to consider both sides of the argument. To do so is to determine how the US respectively helped and hindered cultural restitution.

Firstly, the establishment of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (the Roberts Commission) in 1943 and its significance in the subsequent creation of the Monuments, Fine Arts & Archives (MFA&A or the Monuments Men) shall be discussed. Following this, post-war restitution shall be examined by observing the protocol followed when restituting looted art. This entails the examination of the various collecting points established in the American zone of occupation in 1945. Finally, the legal and illegal looting carried out by American forces shall be acknowledged. This shall highlight the fact that German forces were not alone in the appropriation of cultural heritages. All of this shall be done with the use of transcribed interviews of persons involved in restitution with documents pertaining to the aforementioned organisations, including MFA&A reports.


\textsuperscript{73} The Monuments Men (Dir. George Clooney, 2014); \textit{Woman in Gold} (Dir. Simon Curtis, 2015).

\textsuperscript{74} Alford, \textit{Nazi Plunder}, p. 91-95 describes a case of US military looting which has not been examined in this chapter but is relevant to the discussion.
The Roberts Commission

As the Second World War progressed, the extent of Nazi plunder grew apparent and leading art experts grew fearful that, “the impending battles in Europe would threaten priceless cultural heritage”. Following increased pressure to act from such experts, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed the aforementioned American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, in Europe, 23 June 1943. Also recognised as the Roberts Commission – after its Chairman the Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts – it was tasked with the prevention of “the greatest possible damage”; saving “the greatest possible number of monuments” and “the protection and conservation of works of art” (as well as its restitution). To complete these objectives, the Commission needed to collaborate with the Army, the Department of State, the School of Military Government and relevant civilian organisations. Thereafter, Commander-in-Chief, Dwight D. Eisenhower informed all commanders that they ought to assist the Commission’s efforts wherever possible. This address went as follows:

If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our men, then our men’s lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the choice is not always so clear-cut as that. In many cases the monuments can be spread without any detriment to operational necessity. Whilst the protection of European historical monuments and cultural material was never to be prioritised ahead of the Allied military campaign, this directive gave all officers the necessary

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75 Petropoulos, Art as Politics, p.3/4.
authority to protect architecture, art and scientific and cultural collections. Roberts Commission member Walker Hancock maintained that had there not been this directive, “there would have been no hope at all” for the fine arts officers involved.

Subsequently, the commission produced lists, handbooks, guides and atlases to be distributed across the army, which documented the location of valued artefacts. Despite the Commission’s efforts, in this respect it had limited influence for the documents it produced were not as widely distributed as necessary. This random distribution evidently lacked instruction. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Roberts Commission to attach museum personnel (and architects) – “from all branches of the service: Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force” – to military units represented a more successful aspect of their work. It was through said recommendations that the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives programme was adopted by the War Department’s Civil Affairs Division (CAD). Arguably, these recommendations were more successful for they involved the hiring of staff who could implement the necessary precautions to protect European culture. Their employment could allow the army to continue with less disruption. Evidently, the Roberts Commission laid the foundation for co-operation in American cultural preservation by acting as a necessary “channel of communication”. It bridged the gap between the art community and the military. Robert Edsel went so far to say that if not for the Roberts Commission’s “prestige” it is unlikely the US Army would have tolerated the restitutional efforts of the MFA&A in the following years. Thus, whilst the papers produced by the Commission were unable to significantly impact the cultural preservation when initially circulated, they were still vital to American restitution for it gathered the staff necessary for its later success.

80 Ibid.
82 Woolley, Record of the Work Done by the Military Authorities, p.6.
83 Edsel, The Monuments Men, p.53.
The Monuments Men

Charles Parkhurst articulated the motivation of the MFA&A to protect European culture in the Second World War when he recalled, “it’s all our heritage, we’re all Europeans in our roots; not all of us, but...our culture is”.\(^\text{84}\) Concurrently, Laurie Rush argued that the “preservation of cultural property can be critical for social restoration in a devoted community”.\(^\text{85}\) A small commission, the MFA&A was comprised of officers removed from their earlier commands for “special duty”.\(^\text{86}\)

Although officially a dual operation between Britain and the US, in reality it was staffed by 350 men and women transferred and drafted from approximately 13 nations, from 1943 to 1946.\(^\text{87}\) At its peak, the staff did not exceed 35 members and many worked in the field with limited intercommunication.\(^\text{88}\) They worked without adequate transport or supplies and their objective was by no means a military priority.\(^\text{89}\) Consequently, “pools” of staff were formed “so that they could be distributed to the best advantage”.\(^\text{90}\) Charles Hunzelan considered them the “smallest and most distinguished group” despite having always been “overworked, undermanned, under-supported, and overlooked”.\(^\text{91}\)

Initially, their focus was to lessen the damage caused to monuments and structures like churches and museums by working directly on the frontline. Monuments were in place and their destruction was visible. It was not necessary to ask any questions as to what had happened to them; action was perceptibly required.\(^\text{92}\) MFA&A reports and the aforementioned interviews enlighten us as to what methods were used to protect monuments once found. From different US army units,

\(^87\) Edsel, The Monuments Men, p.2.
\(^88\) Hunzelan, “Some Trials, Tribulations and Successes”, p.56.
\(^90\) “Art treasures in Europe Allied measures for protection”, The Times, 2 February 1944.
\(^91\) Hunzelan, “Some Trials, Tribulations and Successes”, p.56.
\(^92\) Transcribed interview with Samson Lane Faison, 14 December 1981, Smithsonian – AAA.
these reports detail the methods used to protect European edifices. For example, if a building was damaged it would receive “first-aid treatment” or “urgent attention”, or it would be placed “off limits”. The response was entirely dependent on the extent of war damage sustained and resources available.

As the Allies crossed occupied territory, they discovered thousands of caches filled with looted art. In May 1945 the MFA&A made their most significant discovery in a mine in Alt Aussee: 6,500 paintings (and the core of Hitler’s collection). Consequently, the MFA&A’s objective grew to include: the location, identification and examination of works of art. To do this, it mapped the cultural landscape, taking into account key accumulations of cultural property. It was at this point we see the first concerted efforts to “mitigate cultural damage” and restore the status quo through restitution.

The Central Collecting Points

Whilst restitution had been discussed throughout the war, the priority was protection not cultural restoration. With the close of war it was then possible to address restitution with greater certainty. Recovering hidden treasures from locations like the Alt Aussee mine was a formidable endeavour made more difficult by limited personnel. As Krysia Spirydowicz recognised, the staffing of collecting points was particularly problematic since there were no soldiers to be spared. The original ambition for the MFA&A to have “a lieutenant colonel; two majors and a sizeable field staff” had

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95 Nicholas, “Looted Art”.
96 Rush, “Cultural Property Protection”, p.40
already been scaled back. With the end of war and the removal of troops, available staff were even scarcer. Working conditions were exhausting. Lieutenant Commander of the MFA&A George Stout recalled how some repositories were so deep, “You could go, I think for eight or ten kilometres underground and not repeat yourself”. When discovered – or confiscated - the contents of said repositories had to be carefully brought above ground. Having done that, they were then transported to one of the four collecting points in the US zone of occupation (established in 1945): the Offenbach Archival Depot or the Marburg, Wiesbaden and Munich Collecting Points.

The objective was to trace an item’s origins back to its pre-war ownership as restitution was restricted “to identifiable items in existence prior to enemy occupation”. Subsequently, officers would supervise the packing – in one instance with fur coats – and shipping of artwork to its owner, provided the paperwork for its return was satisfactory. Once returned, it was given to the government of the nation from which it was taken. That government would then handle its individual restitution. Upon their return, these items were no longer the responsibility of the American government, nor were they liable for damages. Instead of returning every item encountered, there was a “token restitution of real magnitude”. Items of significant value, like a number of paintings from the Rothschilds’ collection, would be returned but a general “come and get it” policy developed for the majority of pieces. Until 1951, experts would come to the collecting points to retrieve enemy appropriated material. This was possible because a number of MFA&A men remained in Europe with a task force of vetted Germans, despite “official” disbandment of the MFA&A in 1946.

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99 Ibid.
101 Kurtz, America and the Return of Nazi Contraband, p.65.
103 Transcribed interview with Thomas Carr Howe, June 2-3 1976, Smithsonian – AAA, p.47.
104 Ibid.
105 Nicholas, “Looted Art”.

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Individual claimants did not always get back that which had been taken. It was not always possible to prove ownership to the satisfaction of the local authorities and many individuals could not be found. Plunder had targeted those of Jewish origin, many of whom were killed during the Holocaust; others were simply “scattered, demoralized, and too busy reconstituting their lives” to make a claim or be found. Following that it was necessary to try to trace their heirs. Fortunately for the Monuments Men, the ERR was meticulous in recording the origins of their plunder (as was pertained to in the first chapter). When found in the Neuschwanstein Castle, these records could be used as assistance in restitution. Similarly, Rose Valland, the secretary of the director of the Jeu de Paume, had assumed the role of Nazi collaborator. In fact, she was part of the resistance movement. She secretly recorded where appropriated works of art brought to the museum had come from and where they were heading. Monuments Man, Stanton Catlin, believed these records were the “key that unlocked the whole restitution of the stolen works of art in Europe”. Estimates for the number of items restituted from the Central Collecting Points ranges from 250,000 to several million.

US looting

As the restitution process developed in the chaotic aftermath of the Second World War, widespread looting occurred at the hands of civilians and allied forces. As Kenneth Alford recognised, “the sad and embarrassing fact...is that many Americans participated in widespread theft in the weeks and months following the end of the war”. This illegal procurement of mementos, however, did not

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106 Marrus, Some Measure of Justice, p.38.
108 Transcribed interview with Stanton L. Catlin, 1 July – 14 September 1989, Smithsonian – AAA.
110 Alford, Nazi Plunder, p.iv.
“rankle so much” as the sanctioned looting in 1945. Such looting refers to the 202 pieces of art transported from the aforementioned Wiesbaden Collecting Point to Washington’s National Art Gallery. Taken primarily from the Kaiser Frederick Museum, these pieces were the most valuable paintings of the German government, gifted and collected years before the outbreak of the Second World War. President Truman tried to justify his actions, validating the acquisition of the items “for purposes of protective custody”. Ironically – and hypocritically – the argument presented by the US government was the same as the argument made by those who co-operated in the appropriation of artwork throughout World War Two. At this time, the Allied powers were in the process of prosecuting those involved in the looting of art; carried out under the pretence of “safekeeping” such items. During Alfred Rosenberg’s trial he too had defended his actions, maintaining he had taken “collections into custody to protect them from the ravages of war”.

For that reason, MFA&A officers and German citizens feared the confiscations were really reparation claims disguised as restitution. Thus, if taken the items would never be returned. Thirty fine arts officers were so outraged by the removal of this art work that they produced the Wiesbaden Manifesto, 7 November 1945. Producing the letter which voiced their protestations, the sentiment of the Specialist Officers in the Manifesto can be summarised as follows:

We are unanimously agreed that the transportation of those works of art...establishes a precedent which is neither morally tenable nor trustworthy...though our obligations are to the nation to which we owe allegiance, there are yet further obligations to common justice, decency, and the establishments of the power of right, not might.

In reality, there was no reason for the items to be dangerously transported to the US. They were already stored safely in the Central Collecting Points made weather-proof in the preceding

112 Ibid, p.274.
113 Alford, Nazi Plunder, p.120.
115 Ibid.
months. The transportation of the collections to the USA “contradicted the central tenet of their mission – to protect European cultural heritage for the Europeans” and tarnished the image of the MFA&A officers both at home and abroad. Despite good intentions those of the MFA&A who signed the letter received severe criticism. They faced the threat of being court marshalled and the items were transported to Washington anyway. Fine arts officer Captain Edith Standen was so strongly opposed to the government’s actions that, following the incident, she vowed to never work for a government agency again.

Although it is not apparent what motivated the return of the pieces, from 1949 to 1955 these works of art were eventually returned to the American zone of occupation. The funds raised in their tour of America were then used to vaccinate German children. Despite their return, there was lingering resentment. The protestations of the specialist officers most qualified to safeguard Europe’s art had been ignored. As Avi Beker argued, " Returning looted art is, fundamentally, a matter of moral justice and memory". Not only had the US government gone against the advice of those assembled to protect European art but they chastised them for maintaining the policy they were hired to enforce.

**Conclusion**

Whilst the establishment of the Roberts Commission and its subsequent publications may have had limited influence, the recommendations it made for the MFA&A had substantial implications. The efforts to protect cultural heritage in an ongoing conflict were unprecedented. Similarly, for the first time “no distinctions were made between the cultural materials of the victors and the vanquished”. Looted products whose pre-war ownership could be determined were to be legally

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120 Spirydowicz, “Rescuing Europe’s Cultural Heritage”, in *Archaeology*, p.25.
returned to their nation of origin as a gesture of the MFA&A’s authenticity. Rather than retain that which was stolen by Nazi forces as part of “reparations settlements growing out of World War II”, they were to be restored to their legal owner.\textsuperscript{121} Although their success ought to be accredited in part to the records of the ERR and Rose Valland, the organization of the four collecting points allowed for nations to retrieve looted items years after the MFA&A was disbanded. As Lynn Nicholas argued, the salvage of looted artwork “accomplished in the chaos of war-torn Western Europe, was nothing short of miraculous”.\textsuperscript{122} Despite its limited personnel, the MFA&A was a well-educated agency, capable of functioning in exhausting circumstances. The US government’s actions did threaten the reputation of the MFA&A and its associates, however, its actions evidently were not representative of the restitutitional agency’s policies. The drafting of the Wiesbaden Manifesto made this more than apparent.

\textsuperscript{121} Kowalski, \textit{Art Treasures and War}, p.74.
Chapter 3: The unsung hero? The British protection and restitution of Europe’s art

While American restitution efforts have been considered in secondary literature, there is less literature available on the discussion of British restitution.\(^{123}\) On the one hand, there exists the reasonable belief that with the damage suffered to her territory, Britain was more reluctant to participate in attempts to compensate the victims of Hitler’s tyranny.\(^{124}\) On the other hand, whilst the operation of British officers in the MFA&A is acknowledged, these seem to be one of the only circumstances under which Britain is considered to have participated in restitution. Owing to the fact British activities are viewed as indistinguishable from those of the MFA&A, there exists the notion that America was more important in establishing a lasting post-war restitution process. Thus, it has not been considered necessary to research British undertakings separately and outside of the organisation.

As this chapter will show, Britain’s role in the restitution of Nazi-looted art was more important than is currently acknowledged. For example, like the US, the United Kingdom was a signatory of the “Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation and Control” in January 1943, months ahead of the first clear American attempt to progress restitution procedure via the Roberts Commission.\(^{125}\) However, unlike Britain, the USA had actually had very little – if any – influence on the negotiations preceding the Declaration. Having already discussed the more notorious American restitution efforts in the previous chapter, this chapter shall now examine British participation. This shall be done by examining the motivations for and implications of said Declaration whilst also discussing the

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\(^{124}\) Lillteicher, “West Germany and the Restitution of Jewish Property”, in Dean, Goschler and Ther eds., Robbery and Restitution, p.116.

\(^{125}\) Copy of “Inter-Allied Declaration”.

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operation of British Officers in the MFA&A. Moreover, Britain’s endeavours to aid the protection and return of stolen cultural property independently through the British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives and Other Material in Enemy Hands (the Macmillan Committee) shall be analysed.

**Britain and Allied nations against “Acts of Dispossession”**

As the war progressed, rumours of the extent of Nazi despoliation were substantiated by Allied forces who had witnessed for themselves the aftermath of Hitler’s orders when advancing across Europe. The Führer instigated laws to create a sense of legitimacy whilst looting but the activities carried out on his command were clearly a breach of international law nonetheless. Consequently, the Allied powers announced the Inter-Allied Declaration to warn neutral states of their intent to “do their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practised by the Governments with which they are at war”. Created at the behest of the British government it was also known as the “London Declaration”. Signed by 17 nations and the French National Committee, the Declaration was not only an explicit symbol of unity against the actions of the Axis powers but against the compliance of third parties also. The number of signatories testifies to their agreement upon the principles of restitution. Through the Declaration, the transfer of property acquired by the Axis powers in occupied territory, through plunder or looting, “legally” or voluntarily, was then declared invalid. As Lyndel Prott argued, “The Declaration of London of 1943 marked a new departure in

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127 Copy of “Inter-Allied Declaration”, p.2/3.
129 Copy of “Inter-Allied Declaration”, p.3.
many ways”.\textsuperscript{130} It unambiguously announced its procedures ahead of any peace treaty that would have permitted command “by virtue of victor’s dominance”.\textsuperscript{131} Even if it meant taking the items from “bona-fide good faith acquirers”, it was made transparent looted artefacts would be restituted.\textsuperscript{132} Furthermore, it created a subcommittee to gather information on methods of plunder as a means of discovering transfers to be invalidated.

Although there was evidently a determination to commence with international restitution, the document did not unequivocally state how the pillage of occupied territory would be quelled. There was no explanation as to how transfers would be invalidated. Nor were the repercussions an offending party would face made clear in its points. Meanwhile, the creation of the subcommittee did not offer a means of implementing the Declaration as the more vulnerable allies had wanted. These concerns, however, were addressed by the Allies in the notes accompanying the Declaration. It was rationally said that it was “obviously impossible for a general declaration of this nature to define exactly the action” to be taken whilst enemy occupation was enduring.\textsuperscript{133} However, decisions of invalidation could be made by the concerned nation, should they take into consideration the individual circumstances of the situation.\textsuperscript{134} Any decisions made would then be supported and enforced by the other signatories, again demonstrative of their solidarity.

It is possible that the many of the signatory powers of the Declaration did not push boundaries because, despite good intentions, “the fate of nations did not hinge on cultural conservation or restitution”.\textsuperscript{135} Each nation had to prioritise itself and domestic matters. Following the damage faced on home territory, leaders were reluctant to place further burdens on the tax payer.\textsuperscript{136} Britain was in a difficult situation. Though expected to organise and fund the repatriation of

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{133} Copy of “Inter-Allied Declaration”, p.3.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Ibid}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{135} Kurtz, \textit{America and the Return of Nazi Contraband}, p.73.
\textsuperscript{136} Constantin Goschler, in Dean, Goschler and Ther eds., \textit{Robbery and Restitution}, p.116.
art objects, she was suffering the consequences of an ongoing war. Though outwardly impressive, Britain’s initial attempt at restitution could do no more than “warn the invaders concerning the inadmissibility of massive plundering of cultural property”.¹³⁷

Nevertheless, the Declaration made for good publicity in Britain. The government was seen to be combatting the confiscation process that was “further extended and accelerated” to fund the Axis campaign.¹³⁸ Similarly, they were restoring the culture of European victim’s. One extract from The Guardian encapsulated this British interpretation of the Declaration when it wrote it was made “clear that the Allies will do their utmost to defeat this systematic spoliation”.¹³⁹ Meanwhile, The Times displayed its support for the Allies when it agreed “the victors must see to it that restoration is made in the fullest measure possible”.¹⁴⁰

**Britain’s role in the MFA&A**

From the outbreak of war the Allied governments were divided with regards to the principles and mechanisms of cultural preservation and restitution. Fortunately for the predominantly Anglo-American MFA&A, British attitudes were more closely aligned with the US’ meaning they were capable of closer collaboration. Initially, the impact of the British side of the MFA&A programme was decidedly limited by a governmental reluctance to act in countries not yet occupied. However, it was realised that to maintain alliances Britain would have to become more concerned with post-war restitution.¹⁴¹ Henceforth, there was no longer the same reluctance to make post-war political guarantees. Military personnel were able and more willing to work alongside the fine arts officers. Once in occupied territory, the men and women of the MFA&A established a base in their respective zones from which they could create a stronger policy making hub. For British officers this was the

¹³⁸ Copy of “Inter-Allied Declaration”, p.3.
¹⁴⁰ “Totalitarian Theft”, The Times, 6 January 1943.
unit situated in Celle. Although principally based in Germany, British MFA&A officers also worked to safeguard monuments and fine arts in Burma, Sumatra, Java, and Malaya.142

In 1944, it was proposed that work would take place in Germany, Austria and Italy “to prevent the further ruin” of what had already been damaged and to trace “all works of art and museum collections”.143 In helping to gather evidence about works of art “looted or acquired under some pretext by the Germans”, the British contributed to the return of that with immense value: symbolically and monetarily.144 One of the greatest discoveries of the British officers was that of the hoard of Heinrich Himmler in a farmhouse in Westphalia.145 This was especially significant because – other than Hitler and Goering – Himmler was arguably the greatest art collector in the Third Reich. Moreover, it was fine arts officers from both Britain and America who had found repositories in “mines, castles, monasteries, schools and public and private buildings of every description” in Neuschwanstein, Berchtesgaden and Alt Aussee.146 This looted art was returned to liberated territories, whilst German collections’ – including “degenerate” artwork – was to be reassembled and rehoused.147 If possible, art was given to the relevant nation where the responsibility of returning said matter to its owner was transferred to that government. American restitution applied this same policy. This was essentially made possible because of the principles of the Declaration of London. It was not necessary to show that the item was “owned by a national; rather, it was sufficient that it was simply removed from its territory”.148 Before the MFA&A’s aforementioned disbandment, Britain established German Restitution Offices to continue her work. Vetted German staff worked here under the supervision of British officers until around 1951.

143 Major-General Deputy Commissioner, MFA&A Branch, Interior Division – proposed War Establishment, 23 August 1944, Reference: FO1050/1402, Looted Art Collection, TNA, Kew.
145 De Jaeger, The Linz File, p.139.
147 Deputy Commissioner, MFA&A Branch.
Christopher Knowles argued this course of action was followed because the Labour government of 1945 was more concerned with domestic reform than with giving instructions to authorities in Germany.\textsuperscript{149} Aside from having other priorities, it did not want to, “impose a British model of democracy by dictatorial means”.\textsuperscript{150} British politicians preferred to enable German decision making.\textsuperscript{151} Whilst, this argument is likely to be true, in being “present at the front” Allied Monuments Officers had taken “immediate protective action” nonetheless.\textsuperscript{152} They had saved dozens of damaged monuments that might otherwise have “remained near-ruins” and gathered works of art before they could remain permanently hidden.\textsuperscript{153} Ori Soltes attributed this success to the combined “cooperation and sincere dedication” of all MFA&A officers.\textsuperscript{154} Meanwhile, Jonathan Petropolous believed it is likely that between 1945 and 1950 (between them) the British and Americans returned up to 2.5 million cultural artefacts including: 468,000 paintings, drawings and sculptures.\textsuperscript{155} It was possible for fewer staff members to remain in Europe because of international collaboration. However, due to the location of the greatest artworks in the American zone of occupation – like the Ghent Altarpiece – most recognition has been granted to American MFA&A officers only.

**The Macmillan Committee**

Curator of the Wallace Collection, James G. Mann, summarised the sentiment felt in the Allied art world when considering cultural restitution:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Ibid.}, p.10.
  \item \textit{Ibid p.10/11}.
  \item Crosby, “BBC Broadcast”, p.3.
  \item \textit{Ibid}.
  \item Marrus, *Some Measure of Justice*, p.38.
\end{itemize}
“If more effective steps are not taken now to minimise the destruction which is going on daily there may be very few works of art left to re-allocate after the war”.156

In demonstration of the British commitment to cultural preservation, the Macmillan Committee was established in May 1944 under the Chairman Lord Hugh Macmillan (Minister of Information). This civilian body’s priority was:

To be at the service of His Majesty’s Government in connexion with the post-war restitution of monuments, works of art, and archives misappropriated by enemy governments or individuals in the course of the war.157

Whether or not this priority was the reason for the establishment of the Committee is a contested matter.158 The general impression is that the aforementioned priority was the cause the Committee worked for but not the reason for its formation. Whilst Britain did care about the protection of cultural material (both during and after the war) it was supposedly created for the sake of good propaganda.159 Britain was increasingly concerned by Nazi destruction and yet it was her troops – in the Italian village of Cyrene in early 1941 – who were accused of depredation following its recapture. The Italian government produced the notable propaganda pamphlet *What the English Did in Cyrenaica* highlighting the alleged damage caused during her occupation.160 It transpired that the images of Commonwealth vandalism of Italian museums, monuments and buildings were falsified. The material, however, was enough to persuade the Italian people that the English “had no respect for any element of Italian or Roman history and culture”.161 It was also enough to convince military strategists – still questioning the benefits of a cultural mission – that restitution was important for public opinion of the Armed Forces. Concurrently, British political leaders believed it would serve public morale well. The possible thought that any British civil service might be considered “careless

157 Minutes of Meetings Book, cover page. The list of other directives is also available here.  
159 Kurtz, *America and the Return of Nazi Contraband*, p.43.  
or indifferent” towards the fate of Europe’s “treasured possessions” fundamentally inspired the creation of the committee.\(^{162}\)

Although the Macmillan Committee’s directive specified that it was to function as a post-war body, there were circumstances where exceptions were made.\(^{163}\) In this sense, it was similar in orientation to the Roberts Commission. If it were to be consulted by the War Office throughout the war, just as the American Commission did their authorities, it would advise.\(^{164}\) Furthermore, through 1945 and 1946, the Committee created five volumes, each an “account of the damage done to monuments and works of art in Europe during the war”.\(^{165}\) The original plan had been to create booklet accounts on only Italy using the information they had received to date. Due to the success of the drafted booklets the committee “resolved to proceed with the series in the same format”.\(^{166}\) These were accompanied by maps to be utilised in “air and ground bombardment”.\(^{167}\) These guides demonstrated the international nature of cultural destruction in the Second World War. The military authorities were no doubt better informed by these more comprehensive books than they were by the Roberts Commission’s pamphlets. There was enthusiasm to restore cultural heritage, regardless of location and so public anxiety was eased. Evidently, the Committee had considered its endeavours successful for in its final meeting, it was decided that “its purposes had now to a large extent been

\(^{162}\) “Special Officers needed”, *The Times*, 17 February 1944.


\(^{164}\) *Ibid*.


\(^{166}\) “The tenth meeting of the British Committee on the Preservation of Works of Art, Archives and other Materials in Enemy Hands”, 12 October 1945, in *Minutes of Meetings Book signed by the Chairman*, p.29.

\(^{167}\) “Preservation and Restitution of Cultural and Artistic Materials in War Areas”, 16 May 1944, in *ibid*, p.2.
fulfilled”. Subsequently, the Chairman wrote to the Prime Minister suggesting the Committee be dissolved, as it was in August 1946.

**Conclusion**

Admittedly, Britain’s foremost wartime concern was the achievement “of victory in battle”; not cultural restitution. Nevertheless, the Inter-Allied Declaration of 1943 showed that there was a British ambition to address the cultural imbalance created by Nazi plunder. Although it was created without a universal means of implementation, it offered the opportunity for its signatories to take individual action with the support of the remaining signatories. Moreover, it created significant publicity for a cause that might otherwise have been largely disregarded. The fact that its principles were widely instigated by the MFA&A after the war show that its successes were dependent on the context it was established in. The term “restitution” was not written in the Declaration and yet its implications defined post-war restitution. Not just as the return of identifiable stolen heritage but as the intolerance of “neutral” accomplices. Had that not be done, the progress of restitution could have been a lot slower. Throughout the war, its influence may have been limited but it was highly symbolic. As Richard Bevins understood, “progress, or lack of it, on the wider problems of restitution...in the end determined success of efforts to restore looted art”. Evidently, there was greater progress with regards to restitution once the war had ended. Much of this success owes itself to the publications of the Macmillan Committee, released to better inform the military. Regardless of ulterior motives, Britain endeavoured to return all that she had recovered. For that reason, British restitution ought to receive greater accreditation.

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168 “The eleventh meeting of the British Committee on the Preservation of Works of Art, Archives and other Materials in Enemy Hands”, 8 April 1946, in ibid, p.35.
169 Ibid.
170 Knowles, Winning the peace, p.10.
Conclusion

In April 2016, Amadeo Modigliani’s ‘Seated Man with a Cane’ (1918) was seized in Geneva. Worth up to approximately £18million ($25 million), the piece was allegedly looted by the Nazis in 1939 before its owner, Jewish art dealer Oscar Stettiner, fled. Seventy years later, an ongoing lawsuit submitted by his last surviving heir seeks its return. The rediscovery of documents concerning restitution and the subsequent continuation of restitution attempts, first initiated in 1946, demonstrates the present importance of restitution. To determine the lawful ownership of works of art it is necessary to follow record trails to trace its origination. In studying restitution procedure and corresponding documentation, the location of the necessary identification is possible. As Avi Beker argued, the discovery of lost artwork represents the “final frustration of the attempts by Nazi Germany to impose a homogeneous and limited cultural view on the world”.

Although future research could study other figures – like the aforementioned Utikal – this dissertation has shown the influence of two key figures in the ERR’s existence: its namesake Rosenberg and its self-appointed proprietor Goering. Both undoubtedly contributed to the enormity of Nazi plunder. It was not simply because Hitler’s ambitions were officialised. Goering’s presence did create confusion but the instability he created did not limit its efforts. Meanwhile, Rosenberg is recognised today as he was then, head of the ERR only by name. His provision of substantial staff allowed for this recognition but without Goering’s influence, it is likely the ERR would not have been the formidable task force it was.

Meanwhile, it is understood that the role of the US in cultural preservation and restitution was always going to be greater than the British role during and after the Second World War. She had not faced the same damage as her counterpart and so was capable of providing greater contribution. That the importance of Britain equals that of the US is not what has been argued in this

dissertation. Rather, this dissertation has argued that Britain ought to be more greatly acknowledged.

Despite the more common recognition of the US as the most valuable contributor to cultural preservation this dissertation has argued that even her efforts ought to receive greater attention. However, this dissertation has also shown that there needs to be greater objectivity when doing so. America was not simply the saviour. Although their behaviour was not condoned, her troops were one of the greatest inconveniences to the organisations commissioned to undo Hitler’s plundering. The forces of each nation participated in illegal looting but none seems to have been as widely reported as that carried out by the US’ armed forces.

Furthermore, as Richard Bevins summarised, “the story of British policy towards the restitution of looted art mirrors that of restitution in general”.174 Significant events like the establishment of the parallel Roberts Commission and Macmillan Committee has shown how, even when faced with contrasting circumstances, Allied actions were essentially the same. Britain may have formed the Macmillan Committee for the sake of good publicity but the US had formed the Roberts Commission when Roosevelt succumbed to pressure from civilian officials. Each had participated in the wartime MFA&A and each had formed collecting points, active even with the MFA&A’s disbandment. This was possible because of the unit’s combined organisation. Not just that of the US.

Even with the greater damage she had faced, Britain sought to protect European culture. Her role in the negotiation of the Inter Allied Declaration was instrumental for cultural preservation. It provided a foundation for post-war restitution which would have postponed restitutio nal activities had discussion of the implementation of restitution only begun once fine arts officers were in occupied territory. It was understood that the movement of artwork could be invalidated if decisions were made by taking into consideration individual circumstances. In the same way, it is necessary to

take into consideration, the significance of the Declaration in the context of British political interests. Her priority was reparations and demobilization. Arguably, it is for this reason that there is an absence of statistics representative of the British restitution of Nazi looted art (aside from American restitution). It is assumed restitution was not a British priority and so it should not be a priority in research. However, without this, the history of the MFA&A remains incomplete. Evidently, scholarship on this topic would benefit from the quantification of Britain’s independent efforts that are, as of yet, underrepresented.

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